

Book # 11

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4/29/04 Interview with General Paul Weaver

— M.K.  
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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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- Day of 9-11
- Took train TO D.C. from Virginia.
- His office is on 12<sup>th</sup> FL. of JP1 in Crystal City, Va.
- AAL11 had just hit WTC 1 when he arrived in his office.
- He is frozen on the T.V.
- He oversees the Budget of the ANG.
- He says he "Commands nothing" as the Director of ANG.
- He saw 2<sup>nd</sup> ALC hit WTC-2.
- "Then I knew we were under attack"

- He heard noise from AAL 77 before it struck the Pentagon.
- He called Gen. Larry Arnold that morning. - most likely after Pentagon was hit.
- Gen Arnold said FAA was grounding all A/C, (all commercial A/C)
- Arnold said we are bringing up all our assets and Tankers.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> call TO Gen Arnold - (1 TO 1.5 hrs. into start of event)  
"What do you need?"
- Gen. Arnold said we still have 5 commercial A/C Unaccounted for.
- He was impressed with Arnold's actions and has known him for many years.
- After event ended, he and Arnold ~~discuss~~ discussed the "What ifs" - (could we have done something better?)



- He does not recall ever being briefed pre 9-11 on a threat ~~of~~ similar to the threat of 9-11.
- Gen. Arnold told him that they were given authority to shoot down ~~Commercial~~ Commercial A/C.  
↓
- He interpreted Arnold's words to ~~be~~ mean a nationwide authority to shoot down Commercial A/C.
- Paul Kimmel was Weaver's Chief Operating Officer.
- He did not talk to Andrews AFB ~~at all~~ that morning during attacks.
- He talked to General Dave Wherley later in the day.
- 113<sup>th</sup> F.W. → D.C. Air Natl. Guard.  
↳ Andrews AFB.
- Col. Larry Brooks was probably called to go to Andrews AFB early on the morning.

- Mr. Wherby - Cmdr. of D.C. Air Natl. Guard.
  - He was not brought into ROE discussions / Decisions.
  - He learned about UAL 93 Crash from Mr. Arnold.
  - Arnold was not sure at first if military shot down UAL 93.
    - ↳ Later on Arnold said he was absolutely sure military did not shoot down UAL 93.
  - When they reviewed actions of fighter A/C later that day they realized no fighters were close to UAL 93 to shoot it down enough.
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- Afternoon of 9-11 - They started to piece together events of day.
  - They started to secure JP 1.
  - Not sure attacks were over.
  - Then they discussed the "What ifs?"



— Gen. Arnold discussed what if scenarios even though Arnold not in his Chain of Command.

— We've replaced Gen. Dan Sheppard.

— Pre 9-11 → Tremendous pressure to reduce ANG Alert sites below # that existed on 9-11.

\* — need to get testimony before Senate by Gen. Sheppard (around 1995-96). → Senate suggested ANG Alert sites should be reduced.

— Pre 9-11 → ANG was "looking out". We were concerned with threats coming from Caribbean (South). — Still Cruise missile threats, Soviet Bomber threat, ~~and~~ Rogue nation threat.

— Afternoon of 9-11 →

Everybody was reviewing (including the media) the timing and timeline.

of the attacks,

- On 9/12/01 ~~on 9/12/01~~ - he had discussions with DoD Public Affairs Officer - Tony Clarke. (~~Illegible~~).
- He wanted to get timeline out immediately.
- DoD Public Affairs did not want immediate release of timeline.
- Air Force ~~did~~ Combatant Cmdr. did not really want timeline out.
- Mtg at Pentagon in afternoon of 9/12.
- He took the lead in pulling timeline together.
- He believed it was imp. to quickly release timeline.
- Gen. Arnold, Paul Kennel, Gen. Wherley, Tony Brooks,



etc. ~~was~~ gave him the basis for his understanding of timeline of events.

— NORAD Public Affairs people did not want to release timeline on 9/12 or 9/13.

\* — DoD Public Affairs never gave Approval or Disapproval for release of timeline of events of 9-11.

— He wanted the story out

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→ He met w/ DoD public Affairs folks (hr prior to DoD press Conference. → This was normal SOP.

— He was not involved w/ FAA regarding reconstruction of events.

— NORAD (Gen. Eberhart) had the lead in dealing w/ FAA regarding reconstruction of events.

- The day he leaked information on timeline of events → Weaver was chastised. → This prompted NORAD to issue its ~~9/11~~ 9/18 press release.
- He heard from "back channels" that NORAD PA had a problem <sup>9/12 or 9/13</sup> when he briefed media on ~~9/11~~ on timeline ~~of 9/11~~ at Pentagon. ~~on~~

[ Ron Rand - 1<sup>st</sup> AF - was his POC ]

- NEADS was sure w/in 24-48 hrs. of timeline of events.
- Don Aris was a POC at CONR.
- Col. Scott - ("good man" Weaver says)
- NEADS/CONR/NORAD folks did not specifically tell Weaver what sources they reviewed to reconstruct timeline of events.



— Re: UAL 93 - Weaver wants to know where the military A/C were in relation to UAL 93.

— Weaver says they were aware of UAL 93.

— Gen Arnold gave him the times of FAA notifications to the military.

— Brig. Gen. Doug Moore

↳ He knows a Gen. Doug Moore from Fresno, California.

— Paul Kimmel  
— Larry Brooks  
— Gen. Larry Arnold

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\*

Gen. Paul Weaver. Dir. ANG (former)

- Private co hired by NY to west. internet re T found tons of embedded comms

- called Long right away - we've got a prob.

\* after P impact

LA tells him of grounding of all commairc, + bringing up all ANG assets.

↳ PW pledges his full support

- 2<sup>nd</sup> call "How goes it, what do you need"

↳ LA we're still got 5 unaccounted A/C (2 / hr to 1.5 hr into events)

\* pretty much an open line to LA

- impressed w/ our (DoD/ANG) reactions

□ - Later that day looked @ the "what ifs" of the response

• Pre-9/11

- can't recall ever being briefed on such a threat; our units ran "what if" scenarios all of the time.

- mid 90's (95/96) Atlant. City 2 pilots ran practice intercept on a Commairc. Got hell for this incident → wasn't really planned

- RoE against commairc

\* - Larry Brackles (Dep. COO, worked for Kimmell)



## Post Events

- looked @ OTIS, Conley etc.
- next day press conf.
- NORTAD was not going to release anything.
- My Prob. w/ that was why.

## - What If's Effect:

- extensively w/ LA, going through scenarios
- doesn't recall any threat briefings
- Senate Authorization Com

out

→ Gen. Sheppard's defense of A-10 - 95/96  
\* told it was all "poor" spending

□

Ram study.

9/12

- only w/ Tarrick Clark pre Press Conf.
- did not want to go through timeline publicly

- met w/ Tony

→ came from LA, Paul Kimmel, Brooks Whitley,

- We were told NORTAD didn't want it out (PA People) not necess. Gen E
- AF PA Ran Rand

9/13

- we went through Timeline again + again. / telecons
- NORTADS very sure they had it when 48 hrs

① FAA Nof: Did that work?

→ from what we knew @ the time - yes.

Basically took notice time + then  
worked + worked to resolve time

① Langley Scramble

Paul Kimmel - behind, (AL)

Larry Brooks -